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ABSTRACT 
Influenza viruses periodically cause worldwide epidemics, or pandemics, 
with high rates of illness and death. Unlike other public safety emergencies, an 
influenza pandemic will simultaneously affect multiple populations around the 
world. Advance planning for a large-scale, widespread health crisis such as a 
pandemic is required to optimize health care delivery. Prevention and 
preparedness, the primary focus of public health initiatives, will facilitate the 
response and recovery before, during, and after an influenza pandemic. 
An influenza pandemic has the potential to disrupt business operations and 
drain productivity due to ill and absent employees. The expertise, knowledge, 
and skills of the occupational and environmental health nurse (OEHN) at the 
workplace are valuable in helping businesses brace against these losses. Through 
pre-pandemic preparedness, the OEHN can ensure that practical, preventive 
measures and emergency response protocols are incorporated into existing 
business continuity and disaster plans. 
Such measures will be necessary in the event of a pandemic caused by the 
avian influenza virus (H5Nl ). Community and public health resources alone may 
not be sufficient to adequately protect the population. Employers and company 
based employee health organizations can help defray the anticipated strain on 
community resources by developing and implementing preparedness plans in the 
workplace that are realistic and grounded in the preventive health principles of 
primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. 
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This paper provides information that will assist the OEHN in 
understanding the potential risk of avian influenza, dealing with the potential 
threat of a pandemic, and developing a strategy to reduce the impact of ill health 
on the worker and the business. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Influenza, a major cause of sickness and death around the world, is one of 
the most important infectious diseases confronting the world today. Influenza is a 
respiratory infection characterized by headache, fever, and a short dry cough that 
lasts up to a week. According to the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS), influenza was the seventh leading cause of death in the United States in 
2003 with over 66,000 deaths (2003). Influenza is associated with an annual 
mortality rate of over 36,000 (Thompson, Shay, & Weintrauh, 2003). The social 
costs of influenza include 200 million days of restricted activity, 7 5 million days 
of absenteeism, 22 million health care visits, and more than II 0,000 
hospitalizations (Seiguer, 2005). 
Most influenza viruses occur in birds, particularly the aquatic waterfowl. 
Only a few types of influenza virus circulate widely in humans. "Bird flu" or 
"A vi an flu" refers to influenza in birds and to instances where these avian viruses 
jump the species barrier to cause human disease (Bartlett & Hayden, 2005). 
Recently a new strain of influenza in poultry has emerged in Southeast Asia and 
health experts within the World Health Organization (WHO) and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are concerned that this strain of avian flu 
virus called H5Nl could mutate into the next pandemic (WHO, 2005a). Most 
human avian influenza cases from this new strain that have been reported thus far 
have resulted from persons having contact with contaminated birds or bird by-
products. To date, no human-to-human sustainable transmission of this virus has 
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been reported (Ungchusak, eta!., 2005), but health experts are concerned that this 
mode of transmission is possible should the virus mutate. According to the WHO 
(2006a), the death rate from avian influenza (H5Nl) has been high; since 1993 
there have been more than 250 cases reported with a mortality rate greater than 
50% (Table 1.1 ). 
The migratory flight of birds (Figure 1.1 ), the global exportation of 
poultry, and global travel present a possible increased risk for spreading the virus 
from continent to continent, thus increasing the likelihood of a pandemic (WHO, 
2006b ). Scientists believe birds from Southeast Asia, specifically China, 
migrating to Siberia and Russia may have carried the virus with them, mixing 
with birds that then traveled to Europe. In the spring, birds from East Asia 
migrate to the Pacific Islands and to Alaska and northern Siberia, where they 
share breeding grounds with North American birds; in the fall some of these birds 
migrate into the continental United States (US) thus increasing the risk of the 
virus spreading into North America (Food and Agriculture Organization, n.d.). 
Scientists are working to develop a vaccine for this strain of virus but most 
experts predict that it would take up to six months to develop and produce an 
effective vaccine after the emergence of the pandemic (WHO, 2004). Currently 
all influenza vaccine development is done in chicken egg, a slow process that can 
take a year to complete (Figure 1.2). A new and faster technology of developing 
vaccines in human cells needs to be advanced and funding for such research 
should be a priority. In November 2005, US President George W. Bush proposed 
spending $7.1 billion over three years to prepare for the threat of a pandemic 
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TABLE 1.1 
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF CONFIRMED HUMAN CASES OF AVIAN 
INFLUENZA A/(H5Nl) REPORTED TO WHO 
11 October 2006 
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Source: World Health Organization (2006a). 
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FIGURE 1.1 
BIRD FLU MIGRATORY ROUTES 
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Source: Microsoft National Broadcast Company (2006a, March 9). 
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FIGURE 1.2 
INFLUENZA VACCINE HOW IT'S MADE 
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influenza. Nearly $5 billion of the $7.1 billion was allocated for increasing 
domestic vaccine production and stockpiles, and $2.8 billion was dedicated to 
new cell based technology (Lueck & Mathews, 2005). 
Influenza scientists have been predicting another pandemic caused by 
avian influenza for years. The most recent pandemic involving influenza A strains 
with gene combinations from human and avian influenza strains was in 1968 
(Bartlett & Hayden, 2005). Historically pandemics have occurred every 11 to 40 
years. It is believed not to be a question of whether a pandemic will occur but 
when, and H5Nl has made these predictions more worrisome because the protein 
structure on the surface of the H5Nl virus has some of the same characteristics of 
the virus that caused the Spanish Flu pandemic in 1918 ( Harvey, Martin, 
Zambon, & Barclay, 2004). 
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Scope of the Problem 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A pandemic is an epidemic occurring over a wide area, crossing 
international boundaries, and usually affecting a large number of people. 
Influenza pandemics occur when a new strain of virus appears or emerges in the 
human population, causes serious illness, and then spreads easily from person to 
person, continent to continent (DHHS, 2005a). A normal flu season in the United 
States results in approximately 200,000 hospitalizations and 36,000 deaths (CDC, 
2006a). The next influenza pandemic in the US is estimated to affect over 200 
million people with up to 734,000 hospitalizations and could result in 207,000 to 
2 million deaths (Meltzer, Cox, & Fukuda, 1999). The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) has estimated that the financial impact of a mild to severe epidemic 
would be $60 billion to $600 billion respectively (2005). In the event of a mild 
pandemic, 25% of the workforce is likely to be absent an average of four 
workdays during the peak of illness. In the event of a severe pandemic it is 
estimated that 30% of workers would lose as many as 15 work days due to 
personal illness or because they feared the risk of infection at work, or because 
they needed to care for family or friends (CBO, 2005). Additional socioeconomic 
impacts will be experienced with disruption in essential services such as health 
care and transportation. The closure of schools, daycare, banks, restaurants, 
government offices, and shopping centers will cause significant hardship and limit 
access to these services. Food and water supplies may be interrupted and 
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temporary shortages could occur, fuel shortages will impact transportation and 
limit public transportation opportunities. Local governments may institute 
community wide quarantines, and widespread illness in the community will 
increase the likelihood that the medical infrastructure capacity will be 
compromised. The sudden demand for increased services and the shortages of 
personnel who provide essential health services will result in fewer people being 
able to receive the treatment they need which could lead to greater numbers of 
people with increased health complications and more serious illnesses (WHO, 
2005b). To address some of these issues, the Department of Health and Human 
Services has published a plarming guide designed to help individuals and families 
understand the threat of a pandemic influenza outbreak and commonsense actions 
that can be taken in preparing for a pandemic (Appendix A). 
Types of Influenza Virus 
There are three different types of influenza: 1) seasonal flu - a respiratory 
illness that is transmitted from person to person, 2) avian flu - caused by an 
influenza virus that occurs naturally in wild birds, and 3) pandemic flu - a virulent 
flu that causes a global outbreak with little to no natural immunity. All three 
types of influenza are primarily the result of influenza A, B, or C viruses (CDC, 
2005). 
Influenza A, B, and C 
Three influenza viruses (influenza A, B, and C) cause respiratory illness 
and are easily transmitted from person to person. Most reported influenza 
illnesses are the result of the A and B viruses. Illnesses from type C virus are 
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usually milder and cause only minor outbreaks. Influenza type A viruses can 
infect people, birds, pigs, horses, and other animals, but wild birds are the natural 
hosts for these viruses (CDC, 2004a) . Influenza A causes the most severe disease 
in humans and is the most likely to trigger a pandemic (Global Homeland 
Security, 2005). During the 2005-06 influenza season, influenza A HlNl and 
H3N2 and influenza B co-circulated worldwide. In the United States, Influenza A 
H3N2 viruses predominated overall (92%) but influenza B viruses were isolated 
more frequently than influenza A viruses later in the season (MMWR, 2006a ). 
Influenza pandemics occur when there is a noticeable change or shift in 
the genetic structure of a circulating strain of influenza (Bartlett & Hayden, 2005). 
Because of this genetic shift, the human population is exposed to a new virus stain 
for which there is no previous immunity. This lack of immunity makes the 
population susceptible and vulnerable to infection from the newly developed 
pandemic strain. 
Influenza A virus is divided into subtypes based on two proteins on the 
surface of the virus. These two major surface glycoproteins are hemagglutinin 
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA) proteins (CDC, 2004a). The HA subtypes are 
epidemiologically most important because they govern the ability of the virus to 
bind and to enter cells where multiplication of the virus occurs. The NA subtypes 
govern the release of newly formed virus from the cells. Influenza A viruses are 
further subdivided into subtypes dependent on differences in the surface 
glycoproteins. Only two influenza A subtypes currently co-circulate globally in 
humans- HlNl and H3N2 (CDC, n.d.) but there are 16 distinct antigenic 
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subtypes ofHA (Hl to H16) and nine NAs (Nl to N9) that have been identified in 
wild aquatic birds (Nicholson, Wood, & Zambon, 2003). Only influenza A 
viruses infect birds, and all known subtypes of influenza A viruses can infect 
birds. However, there are substantial genetic differences between the influenza A 
subtypes that typically infect birds and those that infect both people and birds. 
Three prominent subtypes of the avian influenza A viruses that are known to 
infect both birds and people are H5, H7, and H9 (CDC, 2005). 
A minor antigenic change or drift in the influenza A virus is the likely 
cause of annual epidemics of influenza around the world. In the northern 
hemisphere, the epidemics occur between October and March and impact the 
elderly and the medically high-risk groups (Table 2.1 ). A major antigenic change 
or shift, may result in a worldwide pandemic if the virus is efficiently transmitted 
from human to human (Nicholson, et a!., 2003). Influenza pandemics occur when 
an entirely new subtype of influenza A virus emerges through recombination or 
reassortment of human and animal antigens. The reassortment occurs when the 
host (e.g., pigs, birds, or humans) becomes simultaneously infected by two 
different viruses, either swine viruses, avian viruses, or human flu viruses (Figure 
2.1 ). The surface glycoproteins of these two viruses permit binding of the cells -
thereby the host becomes a virtual "mixing bowl" for a new virus to mutate 
(Myers, eta!., 2006). This is a particular public health concern in areas where 
pigs, chickens, and people coexist and the viruses are epidemic, thus setting the 
10 
TABLE2.1 
PEOPLE AT IDGH RISK FOR COMPLICATIONS FROM THE FLU 
• People 65 years and older; 
• People who live in nursing homes and other long-term care facilities that 
house those with long-term illnesses; 
• Adults and children 6 months and older with chronic heart or lung 
conditions, including asthma; 
• Adults and children 6 months and older who needed regular medical care 
or were in a hospital during the previous year because of a metabolic 
disease (like diabetes), chronic kidney disease, or weakened immune 
system (including immune system problems caused by medicines or by 
infection with human immunodeficiency virus [HN/ AIDS]); 
• Children 6 months to 18 years of age who are on long-term aspirin 
therapy. (Children given aspirin while they have influenza are at risk of 
Reye syndrome.); 
• Women who will be pregnant during the influenza season; 
• All children 6 to 23 months of age; and 
• People with any condition that can compromise respiratory function or the 
handling of respiratory secretions (that is, a condition that makes it hard to 
breathe or swallow, such as brain injury or disease, spinal cord injuries, 
seizure disorders, or other nerve or muscle disorders). 
Adapted from: CDC (2006b), p. 1, paragraph 3. 
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FIGURE2.1 
VIRUS REASSORTMENT OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL ANTIGENS 
Source: CDC (2004b ), Slide 10. 
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stage for an influenza pandemic to take place. Influenza pandemics occur 
infrequently but they cause substantially higher illness and death rates in the 
generally healthy groups who are not usually affected by annual epidemics. 
Avian Influenza 
Avian influenza, H5Nl, is a highly contagious infectious disease in birds 
caused by a strain of the type A influenza virus. The disease is found worldwide 
and all birds are thought to be susceptible to the disease. Migratory waterfowl, 
ducks, and geese are a natural reservoir for avian influenza virus, and can carry 
the viruses without becoming ill. Of the sixteen subtypes of influenza virus 
known to infect birds, to date all outbreaks have been caused by subtypes H5 and 
H7 (WHO, 2006c ). Avian influenza viruses do not normally infect species other 
than pigs or birds, but in 1997 the H5Nl strain infected 18 humans in Hong Kong, 
of whom six died from the illness (WHO, 2006d). This outbreak was unique and 
alarming because it was the first recognized direct transmission of influenza from 
birds to people (Bartlett & Hayden, 2005). 
According to reports from the WHO and CDC, an influenza pandemic 
threat from the H5Nl virus is real and imminent (Gerberding, personal 
communication, December 1, 2005), and the risk to public health will be great. A 
number of factors influence the threat of a pandemic: 1) the avian flu is a new 
sub-type of the influenza A virus to which there is no human immunity; 
2) reported cases have experienced severe illness with high mortality rates; and 
3) cases show that both adults and children are susceptible to the infection (WHO, 
2006d). Other factors that have heightened concerns among public health 
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officials include laboratory evidence that the virus has become more robust than 
the initial1997 strain and it is able to survive longer under a broad range of 
environmental conditions. The virus has become increasingly pathogenic in 
poultry and has increased the range of species it can infect, now including ferrets 
and domestic cats, and the virus appears to have become resistant to one of the 
two classes of antiviral flu drugs (CBO, 2005). 
Avian flu outbreaks continue to spread in Asia, Africa, and Europe. 
Although there had not been a new human case or single outbreak in poultry 
reported in Vietnam or Thailand as of May 14, 2006, the likelihood of eliminating 
avian flu in this region is doubtful (McNeil, 2006). As long as avian flu 
outbreaks among poultry continue, human infections will occur and it is only a 
matter oftime before a person infected with seasonal influenza A becomes 
infected with H5N1, thus establishing the possible opportunity for the virus to 
mutate and acquire the ability to spread from person to person. 
Past History of Pandemics 
An influenza pandemic is a rare but recurrent event that sweeps quickly 
through populations and causes considerable death in its wake. Intervals between 
previous pandemics have varied from 11 to 42 years with no recognizable pattern 
(Bartlett & Hayden, 2005). Three influenza pandemics occurred in the previous 
century: Spanish influenza in 1918, Asian influenza in 1957, and Hong Kong 
influenza in 1968. The 1918 pandemic killed an estimated 40 to 50 million 
people worldwide, and is considered to be one of the deadliest disease events in 
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human history. Subsequent pandemics were much milder, with an estimated 2 
million deaths in 1957 and 1 million deaths in 1968 (WHO, 2005a). 
1918 Spanish Flu 
The Spanish influenza pandemic is the largest and most rapidly fatal 
pandemic in history; it is the event against which all modem pandemics are 
measured. The HlNl virus spread across the world in less than one year, causing 
at least 40 million deaths (Bartlett & Hayden, 2005). The spread of this influenza 
began in the United States in mid-September and in less than a month it had 
spread across the entire country. The highest mortality rate of the 1918 pandemic 
was in young, previously healthy adults 30 to 40 years old. The average time of 
death after the onset of illness was about seven to nine days. It is estimated that 
approximately 20% to 40% of the worldwide population became ill during the 
three waves ofthis pandemic (Mills, Robins, & Lipsitch, 2004). The severity of 
the Spanish Flu virus has not been seen again in humans, but the fear is that the 
severity potential is there with the avian influenza - the next potential pandemic. 
1957 Asian Flu 
In February 1957, the Asian influenza pandemic involving influenza A 
H2N2 was first identified in China (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Disease, 2006). Immunity to this strain was rare in people less than 65 years of 
age and a pandemic was predicted. In preparation, vaccine production began in 
late May 1957, and health officials increased surveillance for flu outbreaks 
(DHHS, 2005b). 
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Unlike the virus that caused the 1918 pandemic, the 1957 pandemic virus 
was quickly identified due to advances in scientific technology. In the fall as 
children went back to school, they spread the disease in classrooms and brought it 
home to their families. Infection rates were highest among school children, young 
adults, and pregnant women in October 1957 (DHHS, 2005b). In 1957, the global 
death toll was estimated to be around 2 million and in the US, it resulted in about 
70,000 deaths (NIAID, 2006). 
1968 Hong Kong Flu 
The most recent influenza pandemic occurred in 1968 with the Hong 
Kong Flu H3N2 outbreak, which resulted in nearly I million deaths worldwide 
and around 34,000 deaths in the United States (NIAID, 2006) over a two year 
period. Those over the age of 65 were most likely to die. The same virus returned 
in 1970 and 1972. There are a number of reasons that are thought to have 
contributed to this virus resulting in a milder pandemic than the two previous 
pandemics: 1) the virus subtype H3N2 was similar to the subtype of the Asian flu 
H2N2 of 1957, so some level of immunity could have existed, 2) the peak of the 
virus occurred during late December when school children were home for the 
holidays, and 3) improved medical care and antibiotics that are more effective for 
secondary bacterial infections were available for those who became ill (DHHS, 
2005b). 
1976 Swine Flu 
In January 1976, an outbreak of respiratory disease was identified at Ft. 
Dix, New Jersey. The CDC influenza laboratory identified a swine influenza 
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virus strain, H1N1, from patients who possessed hemagglutinin and 
neuraminidase subtypes that had not circulated for more than 50 years (Sencer & 
Millar, 2006). It was concluded that this new strain could inevitably result in a 
pandemic and within three months of this virus identification there was a 
recommendation to begin mass immunization within the United States. In just 
under three months more than 40 million people were vaccinated. However, the 
mass immunization program was stopped after the first three months due to 
several reports of Guillain-Barre syndrome thought to be caused by the vaccine 
(Laitin & Pelletier, 1997). 
Current Outbreak 
Although avian influenza A viruses usually do not infect humans, more 
than 250 confirmed cases of human infection with avian influenza viruses have 
been reported since 1997 (CDC, 2006c ). Avian influenza, specifically the H5N1 
subtype, is the organism that health experts have targeted as a potential source for 
a pandemic in the near future. Outbreaks of avian influenza H5N1 occurred 
among poultry in eight countries in Asia including Cambodia, China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Laos, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam during late 2003 and early 
2004. In an attempt to control the outbreaks, millions of birds were killed and it 
was thought that this action had been effective in stopping the spread of the virus 
(Aetna Inte!Health, 2005). By late June 2004, outbreaks were again reported in 
Cambodia, China, Tibet, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Russia, 
Siberia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Influenza H5N1 infection also has been reported 
among poultry in Turkey, Romania, and Ukraine. Additionally, outbreaks of 
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influenza H5Nl have been reported among wild migratory birds in many 
countries throughout Asia, the Middle-East, Europe, and Africa (Figure 2.2). 
Currently the virus is confined to birds but cats and pigs are also 
susceptible. Most of the humans infected with H5Nl had contact with infected 
birds during processing, cooking, eating, or providing care. According to a report 
on the analysis of 205 human cases of H5Nl since 2003, the overall mortality rate 
of this virus is 56% with the highest mortality of73% in persons between 10 to 19 
years of age (Table 2.2). The average number of days from onset of symptoms to 
death is 8 to 9 days (Table 2.3), the median age of those infected is 20 years with 
90% of the cases less than 40 years of age (Table 2.4). Data provided in Table 2.5 
show there are equal numbers of females and males affected ('N eekly 
Epidemiological Record, 2006) . 
Causative Agent 
Of the 16H and 9N subtypes of the influenza A virus, only the virus of the 
HS and H7 subtypes are thought to cause the avian flu (WHO, 2006d). The virus 
enters the poultry population in a "low pathogenic" form, but within just a few 
months it mutates into a "high pathogenic" form that spreads rapidly in the 
poultry population causing multiple organ system failures. The mortality rate 
from the high pathogenic form of the virus is nearly 100% and occurs within 48 
hours of contact (CDC, 2006d). 
Mode of Transmission 
Most human influenza infections are spread by virus-laden respiratory 
droplets that are expelled during coughing and sneezing. Influenza viruses range 
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FIGURE2.2 
AFFECTED AREAS WITH HSNl IN POULTRY AND WJLD BIRDS 
Areas reporting confirmed occurence of H5N1 avian influenza in poultry and wild birds since 2003 
~\World Health 
~Organization 
~@-~ .. ~_0_0_~: J\ll_rights_r~s~~e~--
Source: WHO (2006e), Slide 3. 
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Table 2.2 
CASE FATALITY RATE OFH5Nl BY AGE 
Case Fatality Rate by Year of Onset and A~;:e Gronp (n= 202) 
Age Case Fatality Rate 
Group 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-2006 
(years) 
<5 (0/0) 71 (5/7) 0 (0/8) 67 (4/6) 43 (9/21) 
5-9 100 (2/2) 88 (7/8) 21 (3/14) 13 (1/8) 41 (13/32) 
10-19 100 (2/2) 85 (11/13) 67 (12/18) 69 (11/16) 73 (36/49) 
20-29 (0/0) 50 (5/10) 55 (11/20) 80 (!2/15) 62 (28/45) 
30-39 (0/0) 75 (3/4) 57 (13/23) 67 (4/6) 61 (20/33) 
40-49 (0/0) 50 (1/2) 38 (3/8) 100 (1/1) 45 (5/11) 
>50 (0/0) 100 (1/1) 10 (1/10) (0/0) 18 (2/11) 
Total 100 (4/4) 73 (33/45) 43 (431101) 63 (33/52) 56 (113/202) 
Case fatality rates are given as percentages (numbers of deaths/number of cases) 
Data as of April 30, 2006 
Source: Weekly Epidemiological Record (2006), p. 254. 
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TABLE2.3 
NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN ONSET OF SYMPTOMS AND DEATH 
35 
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2-3 4-5 6~7 8-9 10~11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 ~ 20 
Nuniber of days between onset of symptoms -and death 
Source: Weekly Epidemiological Record (2006), p. 255. 
21 
TABLE 2.4 
DISTRIBUTION OF HSNl CASES BY AGE GROUP 
Age Group (years) 
Source: Weekly Epidemiological Record (2006), p. 253. 
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TABLE2.5 
HUMAN H5Nl CASES BY SEX AND BY AGE GROUP 
Age group (years) Male Female Sex Ratio 
<5 13 8 1.6 
5-9 19 13 1.5 
10-19 18 31 0.6 
20-29 18 27 0.7 
30-39 17 16 1.1 
40-49 5 6 0.8 
>50 6 5 1.2 
Total 96 106 0.9 
(N = 202) 
Source: Weekly Epidemiological Record (2006), p. 253. 
23 
in size from 0.08 to 0.12 micrometers that are carried in respiratory secretions as 
small-particle aerosols that are less than I 0 micrometers in diameter (Mandell, 
Bennett, & Dolin, 1995). 
The HSNl influenza virus is spread primarily through the saliva, nasal 
secretions, and feces of infected birds. Healthy birds can become infected when 
they come in contact with contaminated excretions or with surfaces that are 
contaminated with excretions or secretions. In addition to being highly 
contagious among poultry, avian influenza viruses are easily transmitted from one 
location to another by the movement of live birds, rodents, animals, and people -
especially when shoes and other clothing are contaminated as well as vehicles, 
equipment, feed, and cages. The highly pathogenic form of the virus can survive 
at cool temperatures in bird feces for at least three months. In water, the virus can 
survive for up to four days at 72° Fahrenheit and more than 30 days at 32° 
Fahrenheit. Studies have shown that a single gram of contaminated manure can 
contain enough virus to infect 1 million birds (Wikipedia, 2006). Some domestic 
ducks are known to be resistant to the virus and can be asymptomatic carriers of 
the virus, thus acting as a "silent reservoir" that perpetuates transmission. Most 
cases of avian influenza infection in humans have resulted from direct or close 
contact with infected poultry (e.g., domesticated chickens, ducks, and turkeys) or 
surfaces contaminated with secretions and excretions from infected birds. The 
majority of the cases have occurred in rural areas where households keep small 
flocks of chickens that roam freely in the yards and houses and share outdoor play 
areas with the children. In many areas in Asia, raising poultry is a source of 
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income and food for the family and when a chicken in the flock becomes ill, it is 
slaughtered and eaten by the family to prevent the spread of illness within the 
flock. 
The spread ofH5Nl viruses from person-to-person has been reported very 
rarely, and transmission has not been sustainable beyond one person. As of 
October 11, 2006, a total of 253 human cases of influenza A, H5Nl infections 
have been reported in 10 countries. The highest number of cases reported in 2006 
is 50 cases in Indonesia (WHO, 2006a) where the first case oflaboratory-
confirmed human-to-human transmission was reported by the WHO on June 23, 
2006. The report of the person-to-person transmission was the result of an 
investigation from a large human cluster in Sumatra, Indonesia where the virus 
killed seven members of a single family. According to a spokeswoman for the 
United Nations WHO, "the virus showed signs of mutation but it did not mutate 
into a form that is more transmissible because it did not seem to go beyond the 
cluster" (Microsoft National Broadcast Company, 2006b, paragraph 3). 
Signs and Symptoms 
In poultry, the virus causes two distinctly different forms of disease - one 
common and mild, the other rare and highly lethal. In the mild form, signs of 
illness may be expressed only as ruffled feathers, reduced egg production, or mild 
effects on the respiratory system. Outbreaks can be so mild they escape detection 
unless regular testing for viruses is in place. The second and far less common 
highly pathogenic form is characterized by sudden onset of severe disease that 
spreads and not only affects the respiratory tract, as in the mild form, but also 
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invades multiple organs and tissues resulting in massive internal hemorrhaging 
(WHO, 2006c). 
In humans, bird flu has caused a range of symptoms. The influenza virus 
usually enters the body through the respiratory tract but can also gain access 
through the intestinal tract. Unlike seasonal influenza in which infections cause 
only mild upper respiratory symptoms in most people, H5Nl infection may 
follow an aggressive clinical course with rapid deterioration and high fatality 
(Table 2.6). 
Initial symptoms ofH5Nl in humans include a high fever, usually with a 
temperature higher than 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit and influenza-like symptoms 
with respiratory infections involving the lower lobes of the lungs. Diarrhea, 
vomiting, abdominal pain, chest pain, and bleeding from the nose and gums have 
also been reported as early symptoms in some patients (WHO, 2006d). Primary 
viral pneumonia and multi-organ failure have been common among people who 
have become ill with H5Nl influenza. 
Workers Affected 
There are significant variances in the estimated impact that an influenza 
pandemic would have on the different sectors of the US society. Reports of 
estimated illnesses from a "medium-level" pandemic in the US could be as high 
as 35% of the US population and the economic impact could reach $166.5 billion 
(CBO, 2005). 
Workers at greater risk for contracting avian influenza as a work-related 
exposure are those employed in health care, airline travel, food handling, wildlife, 
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TABLE 2.6 
COMPARISON OF BIRD FLU TO SEASONAL FLU 
Criteria Bird Flu Seasonal Flu 
SYMPTOMS Persistent fever, cough, sore Fever, cough, runny nose, 
throat, muscle aches, shortness muscle pain. 
of breath and acute respiratory 
distress. Patients can develop 
viral pneumonia, multiple organ 
failure, especially in lungs and 
kidneys, and other severe and 
life-threatening complications in 
a matter of days. So far the virus 
is transmitted through direct 
contact with infected birds. 
MORTALITY RATE Up to 50%. Over 253 people Kills up to 2% of people it 
have become infected with infects, with elderly, young 
H5Nl with the highest mortality children, and people in 
in persons between I 0-19 years developing countries more 
old. at risk. Mortality rates in 
developed countries are 
much lower but in an 
average year, influenza still 
kills between 500,000 and a 
million people globally. 
TREATMENT Prescription antivirals Some vaccines are available 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and to a to prevent infection. 
lesser extent zanamivir Prescription antivirals, 
(Relenza) are the only oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and 
medications that are effective zanamivir (Relenza), are 
against avian flu. The drugs can approved to treat type A 
prevent infection up to 80% and and B influenza, the two 
can treat patients who have had types most responsible for 
symptoms for 2 days or less. flu epidemics. To lessen 
However, flu viruses can severity of the infection, 
become resistant to these drugs, patients need to start 
so these medications may not treatment within two days 
always work. of onset of symptoms. 
Source: Microsoft National Broadcast Company (2006c). 
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and poultry industries - where there is opportunity for direct exposure to the virus. 
In the health care industry, at risk workers include, but are not limited to, doctors, 
nurses, medical aides, veterinarians, X -ray technicians, housekeeping, and 
laboratory and laundry staff. Airline travel workers such as flight crews - pilots 
and flight attendants, as well as the business travelers are at risk when exposed to 
ill passengers who might be traveling in an airplane from areas where avian 
influenza is endemic. Workers in the agricultural industry, especially poultry 
growers and processing plant operators, have a greater risk of contracting avian 
influenza through contact with contaminated poultry and poultry by-products. 
These include animal husbandry/veterinary staff and individuals involved in virus 
outbreak control and eradication activities (e.g., culling euthanasia, carcass 
disposal, cleaning, and disinfection of areas affected by avian influenza) on 
poultry farms or live bird markets. Their exposure risk is increased because of 
prolonged and girect contact with infected birds and/or contaminated surfaces. 
Employment Law Issues 
There are a number of potential employment labor laws and policy issues 
that employers may need to address in the face of a pandemic. Potential issues 
include maintaining a safe and healthy workplace in accordance with 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's General Duty Clause, 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Workers' 
Compensation, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, company 
attendance and absence policies, and compensation during absence due to 
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company shut down (Table 2.7). Some, but not all, of these issues maybe 
addressed in guidance from governmental agencies like the Homeland Security 
Council, but others may need to be addressed on a state, local, or business level. 
Employers should consider inclusion of these potential issues in a company 
specific Pandemic Preparedness Plan and in their Business Continuity Plan and 
Crisis Management Plans. 
29 
TABLE2.7 
POTENTIAL LABOR LAW AND POLICY ISSUES 
Laws/Regulations Policy Issues 
OSHA General Duty • Employer obligation to provide and maintain a 
Clause health and safe workplace may be difficult in a 
pandemic. 
• If an infected employee spreads avian flu at 
work, will the employer face OSHA fines and 
employee lawsuits? 
• Employers may be required to keep infected 
employees away from the workplace against 
the will of the employee in an attempt to keep 
the workplace safe. 
• Telecommuting- how to ensure horne is a safe 
and healthy work environment? 
Americans with • Reasonable accommodations for those with the 
Disability Act (ADA) flu may not be possible. 
• Employees forced to stay horne may claim 
violation of ADA. 
Family and Medical • Can forced leave be covered under FMLA? 
Leave Act (FMLA) 
Workers' Compensation • May be an increase in claims that infection 
occurred at work. 
Health Insurance • Privacy rules may hinder employer knowing 
Portability and health status of critical essential employees. 
Accountability Act 
• Difficulty for employer to communicate (HIPAA) information to employees. 
Source: National Business Group on Health (2006), p. 1, paragraph 2. 
30 
CHAPTER III 
EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH RISK 
In the previous pandemics of the 20'h Century, the world had little time to 
prepare for the event or for the devastating effects that they caused. But in the 
present situation the world has had the benefit of advanced warning, thus 
affording the opportunity to prepare for a potential pandemic and to develop ways 
to mitigate its impact. 
Pandemic Preparedness Planning 
In 1999, the World Health Organization issued the first influenza 
pandemic preparedness plan to guide public health officials in the event of the 
emergence of a novel influenza virus (Weir, Wong & Gemmill, 2004). The plan, 
updated in 2005, outlines a phased approach for response based on the pandemic 
threat level. Each phase or period includes steps to be taken following the 
appearance of a new influenza strain in a single human case (Table 3.1). 
Interpandemic Period 
In the interpandemic period (phases I and 2), a new influenza subtype 
may be present in animals and cause a human infection - but no new influenza 
virus subtypes have been detected in humans. The risk of human infection is 
considered to be low in phase 1, but in phase 2 the circulating animal influenza 
virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. 
Pandemic Alert Period 
In the pandemic alert period (phases 3, 4, and 5), human infections have 
occurred. Within phase 3 (the current state of alert) there has been rare or 
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TABLE3.1 
WHO PHASES OF PANDEMIC ALERT 
Pandemic Period Alert Description Phase 
Interpandemic Low risk cases in humans I 
(New virus in 
animals without 
cases in humans) 
Pandemic alert Greater risk of cases in humans 2 
(New viruses cause 
cases in humans) 
Very limited or no human-to-human 3 
transmission 
Evidence of increased human-to-human 4 
transmission 
Evidence of significant human-to-human 5 
transmission 
Pandemic Efficient and sustainable human-to-human 6 
transmission 
Source: WHO (2006f). 
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no human-to-human spread; phase 4 there are small highly localized clusters of 
human-to-human spread of virus. At phase Slarger clusters ofhuman-to-human 
spread has occurred, illness is still localized geographically, but increased risk of 
larger spread of the disease is possible. 
Pandemic Period 
At pandemic period (phase 6), there is significant increased and sustained 
transmission of the virus in the general population. The development of the WHO 
pandemic preparedness plan requires planning and collaboration among multiple 
partners and disciplines outside of the health sector. These partners include other 
government departments (e.g., agriculture, transportation, trade, labor, defense, 
education, and justice) at multiple levels within the government, as well as 
partners in the private sector, including industry and nongovernmental 
organizations. Additional global planning activities include developing a 
pandemic vaccine and securing adequate supplies of antiviral medications used to 
prevent and treat the influenza virus. 
Interdisciplinary Planning 
An employer based pandemic preparedness plan similar to the WHO plan 
requires collaboration among multiple interdisciplinary teams and business 
partners within and outside of the company. These partners could include 
executive leadership, corporate crisis management, corporate communications, 
security, safety, industrial hygiene, human resources, benefits, maintenance, 
housekeeping, and critical external vendors and stakeholders such as insurance 
plan providers and local health care facilities. The plan should support the health 
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and well being of employees, and maintain or resume critical operations during or 
after an influenza pandemic. The pandemic preparedness plan should work with 
existing plans for risk prevention, infection control, emergency response, 
technology and data recovery, business continuity, and crisis management. An 
example of a Corporate Employee Health Pandemic Preparedness Plan can be 
found in Appendix B. The OEHN who has a strong knowledge in health and 
business is in a unique position to support the development, testing, and 
implementation of an employer based pandemic plan. The OEHN is also a vital 
link in maintaining the health of the employees and impacting the effects that 
health and productivity have on the business. This vital health advocacy role will 
become even more critical in the face of a pandemic when the illness rates are 
projected to be very high. 
Risk Communication 
A critical element of pandemic planning is ensuring that an effective 
communication plan is in place. Employees are likely to be anxious about a 
pandemic and want to know how the company will respond if it occurs. To help 
alleviate employee anxiety and to facilitate effective plan initiation, frequent, 
honest, and accurate information must be communicated. A solid communication 
plan should include information on the company's preparedness plan and where it 
can be accessed. It should provide clear, timely, and pro-active communications 
regarding policies related to attendance, site access, and employee's responsibility 
to protect the health and safety of fellow workers during a pandemic. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ROLE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
NURSE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY TEAM 
One of the most influential and cost-effective actions that can be taken by 
the OEHN to reduce or avoid significant business impact caused by a potential 
pandemic is to educate employees about basic influenza prevention and infection 
control. Educational sessions on exposure routes, preparedness and prevention 
measures, signs and symptoms, recommended actions regarding personal and 
family illness, and at-home care can be delivered in a variety of formats within 
the workplace. The OEHN can deliver key health information to large groups of 
employees at one time through health fairs, lunch and learns, and web cast 
seminars. Other effective educational venues are health poster displays, pamphlet 
distribution, table tents, and email and voice mail messaging. In addition, the 
OEHN can provide one-on-one health coaching when the employee presents to 
the Employee Health Clinic for other health related services. 
Workplace health education and health promotion programs along with 
preparedness planning are key factors that can help defray the effects that an 
influenza pandemic could have on a business. The role of the OEHN will be 
critical in the development of these programs that are based on the preventative 
health principles of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. 
Primary Prevention: A voiding Employee Infection 
The OEHN proactively encourages employees to observe and practice flu 
prevention activities and behaviors as the first priority for guarding against the 
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potential devastating effects of a pandemic. An influenza prevention awareness 
campaign should include: education on the signs and symptoms of seasonal flu 
and pandemic flu, administration of flu shots in the workplace, distribution of 
antibacterial hand wipes and other personal protective equipment (i.e., face mask 
respirators), and education on proper hygiene and nutrition. Employees should be 
repeatedly informed about the need for frequent hand washing with soap and 
water, and when and how frequently they should use sanitizing hand lotions. 
Information on respiratory hygiene such as covering the mouth and nose when 
coughing and sneezing, and the proper disposal of used tissues should be 
provided. 
Although wearing a face mask by the general population has not 
demonstrated an appreciable impact on respiratory infection transmission, 
permitting employees to wear a face mask may reduce fear and anxiety during a 
pandemic. Pre-ordering supplies of respirators, surgical masks, gloves, 
disinfectants, hand sanitizers, and over-the-counter cold and flu medication 
should also be done in the pre-pandemic period. A three month inventory level is 
recommended as these supplies may be difficult to obtain if a pandemic emerges. 
Employers should plan to provide their essential personnel with enough personal 
protective equipment to last at least six weeks. A reasonable approach for 
advance purchase of respirators is to obtain recommended models (i.e., N95 
mask) in quantities sufficient to provide all high risk essential personnel with one 
clean respirator daily for two to six work week periods during a pandemic, or 60 
disposable respirators per person. Multiple sizes of the same model should be 
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purchased where available. As with all respirators, the user will require medical 
clearance and proper fit testing to ensure maximum effectiveness and adequate 
protection. 
A recommended approach for advance purchase of surgical masks for 
non-essential personnel is to buy enough to provide one surgical mask for 50% of 
the total worker population. Although the projected cumulative attack rate of 
influenza during multiple waves of a flu pandemic is not expected to exceed 30% 
(CBO, 2005), an excess in the number of masks available will provide sufficient 
coverage for situations where flu infection rates are higher or where the projected 
attack rate is uncertain. There is no fit testing or medical clearance requirement 
for surgical masks as they can be used by anyone. Education on proper use of a 
surgical mask and its effectiveness is necessary to ensure that the user understands 
that the surgical mask does not provide adequate protection from inhalation of 
airborne virus droplets. A toolkit for employer pandemic plarming for respiratory 
protection, selection, and care is provided in Appendix C. 
Influenza Vaccine 
While the first line of defense for this public health risk is influenza 
vaccine, it is difficult to achieve since the current H5Nl virus circulating in 
Europe, Africa, and parts of Asia has drifted from the virus originally isolated 
from a patient in Vietnam (DHHS, 2006). Vaccines are an important and 
effective medical intervention against influenza and will be critical in the 
prevention and reduction of health consequences during a pandemic. Influenza 
vaccine is produced and administered annually to provide protection against the 
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influenza strains expected to be prevalent that year. The determination of which 
viral strains to include in the annual influenza vaccine is dependant on data 
collected from domestic and international surveillance systems. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) decides which strains to include and also licenses and 
regulates companies that manufacture the vaccine. The 2006-07 trivalent vaccine 
virus strains are A/New Caledonia/2011999 (H!Nl)-like, A/Wisconsin/67/2005 
(H3N2)-like, and B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like antigens (MMWR 2006b). 
Different influenza vaccine preparations have different indications as licensed by 
the FDA. Table 4.1 lists the different formulations and the companies that will 
manufacture vaccine for 2006-2007 influenza season. 
Although vaccines are universally regarded as the most important medical 
intervention for preventing influenza and reducing its health consequences during 
a pandemic, they have never been available early enough and in sufficient 
quantities in the past to have an impact on morbidity and mortality. Efforts are 
under way to develop a vaccine that will prevent a pandemic influenza associated 
with the current avian flu. A number of pharmaceutical companies have been 
given government contracts for the research and development of cell-based 
vaccine production. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, GlaxoSmithK.line, Novartis 
Vaccines & Diagnostics, Medimmune, and DynPort Vaccine (Center for 
Infectious Disease Research & Policy, 2006) are in a race against time and a 
changing virus to develop a cell mediated avian influenza vaccine. According to 
a report released by the Department of Health and Human Services (2006), the 
DHHS has stockpiled 8 million doses - enough for 4 million people based on a 
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TABLE4.1 
INFLUENZA MANFACTURERS FOR THE 2006-07 INFLUENZA 
SEASON 
Manufacture Vaccine Formulation Thimerosal Age 
Preservative Indication 
Saofi Pasteur, • Fluzone® Multi-dose Yes "= 6 months 
Inc. Inactivated TIV vial 
Single dose None "= 36 
pre-filled months 
0.5mL 
synnge or 
vial 
Single-dose None 
pre-filled 6-35 
0.25mL months 
synnge 
Medimmune, • FluMist™ Single-dose None Healthy 
Inc. LAIV sprayer persons 
5-49 years 
Novartis • Fluvirin™ Multi-dose Yes "= 4 years 
Inactivated TIV vial 
(formerly 
Chiron Single-dose < lugHg/0.5 "= 4 years 
Corporation) 0.5mL mLdose, 
synnge preservative 
free 
GSK • Fluarix™ Single-dose < 1.25ug "= 18 years 
Inactivated TIV pre-filled Hg/0.5 mL 
syringe 0.5 dose, 
mL preservative 
free 
Multi-dose 25 ugHg/0.5 "= 18 years 
• FLULAVAL™ vial mLdose 
Source: CDC (2006e, July), p. 3. 
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two dose vaccine, of a H5Nl pre-vaccine that is based on a virus isolated in 2004 
from a Vietnamese patient. A second H5Nl pre-vaccine that is under 
development is based on an H5Nl strain that was collected in Indonesia in 2005 
and has circulated in Europe, Africa, and parts of Asia. The efficacy of these pre-
pandemic vaccines cannot be predicted, but there is reason to believe they may 
provide some level of protection for priority personnel and those at greatest risk 
while a fully effective vaccine can be developed once the virus strain has evolved 
and been identified. 
Secondary Prevention: Minimizing Transmission 
Once the primary prevention goals have been implemented, secondary 
prevention efforts should be deployed to minimize transmission. These activities 
focus on increasing social distancing from infectious employees. Social 
distancing involves measures such as closing schools and workplaces, as well as 
avoiding mass gathetings. These measures will have limited effectiveness in 
stopping human infections once the pandemic begins but may be usefi.Jl slowing 
the pandemic's spread. Because social distancing may be instituted or 
recommended by the public health authorities, advanced planning for such 
measures is encouraged and will minimize the impact on the health of employees 
and business continuity. In the work setting the OEHN can provide guidance to 
management and take a key role in modifying policy guidelines for travel, sick 
leave, remote and flexible working, and attendance management. The OEHN can 
use the toolkit on social distancing (Addendix D) to implement this type of policy 
in the workplace. 
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The OEHN, working in collaboration with management and the company 
travel agency, can ensure that travel to affected/restricted areas is prohibited or 
limited to business critical needs. For those employees required to travel, the 
OEHN should provide instruction on strict personal hygiene, eating practices, and 
the use of antiviral medications to reduce risk of infection. Employees traveling 
to affected areas should monitor their health for 10 days and report 'flu-like' 
symptoms or likely exposure to pandemic influenza prior to returning to work. 
During the influenza pandemic, effective management of illness will be 
essential in reducing the spread of infection and complications associated with 
influenza. A rapid diagnostic test is available for detection and diagnosis of 
influenza and can aid in the assessment of employees at work who have early 
symptoms of illness; however, employees who are ill should be encouraged to 
remain at home to reduce the spread of the virus. The OEHN should work with 
human resources and the benefits departments to establish procedures for the 
management of persons who have been exposed to pandemic flu, those suspected 
to be ill due to pandemic flu, those who become ill while at the worksite, and for 
those returning to work following a pandemic illness. A management guidance 
tool for potential illness scenarios during a pandemic is provided in Appendix E. 
The use of an absence tracking system to record and track the absences of 
employees throughout each wave of influenza pandemic can help in the 
management, identification, and availability of essential personnel as employees 
who become ill during the first wave of the pandemic will likely be immune in 
subsequent waves and available for work. 
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Tertiary Prevention: Implementing Medication and Treatment Interventions 
Businesses that have on-site employee health clinics may call on the 
OEHN to operate the clinic as a primary care treatment facility in the event of a 
pandemic. One of the primary medical treatment interventions recommended 
during an influenza pandemic is the use of antiviral medications. Currently there 
are only two antiviral medications that have been shown to be effective against 
the H5Nl virus. Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza), if given within 
48 hours of the onset of symptoms, have proven to reduce the illness severity and 
duration (WHO, 2005c ). Relenza has also been approved by the FDA as a 
prophylactic treatment for influenza. 
WHO has recommended that countries consider stockpiling antivirals and 
since the supplies are anticipated to be limited, plans should be developed for 
targeting priority groups such as front-line health care workers, emergency 
response personnel, and other essential life-sustaining workers. Many business 
have already started stockpiling antiviral medications as part of their business 
continuity plan to prepare for a pandemic (Schmidt, 2005). Pre-screenings and 
health assessments of employees and their dependants for the provision of the 
appropriate type and quantity of antiviral medications should be done during the 
pre-pandemic period. The utilization of a health questionnaire (Appendix F) and 
a decision flowchart (Appendix G) can aid in the evaluation of which antiviral to 
prescribe and ensure that any contraindications to the medications are identified. 
The OEHN can play a key role in this health assessment process as well as 
determining which antiviral is to be distributed, provided she/he is practicing in 
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accordance with approved protocols and standing orders that are compliant with 
the state nurse practice act where the nurse is licensed. Collaboration with local 
pharmacies and established distribution warehouses in developing a tracking 
system for prescriptions written and dispensed will help ensure adequate supply 
of medications, safe and ethical distribution, and provide for recall and adverse 
event tracking capability if needed. In the event of a public health crisis like 
pandemic flu, the OEHN may be required to provide on-site distribution of 
prescription antiviral medications. This practice will also require that appropriate 
protocols be in place and may need to be approved and cleared by local regulatory 
authorities such as the state Pharmacy Distribution Association. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most company emergency and crisis management plans outline action 
steps required as a result of natural disaster occurrences related to weather or to 
events such as fire, explosions, and chemical spills. These types of events, though 
devastating, are usually of short duration and recovery begins immediately after 
the occurrence. In contrast, pandemic planning requires companies to focus on 
the prolonged business sustainability due to employee illness and high 
absenteeism that could continue for as long as two to three years after the 
pandemic begins. 
Practice and Policy Implications 
A pandemic preparedness plan needs to be comprehensive, adaptable, and 
continually reviewed and updated as situations change in this evolving health 
crisis. Advancements in vaccine development, genetic research, and drug 
discovery will have an impact on the recommendations and treatment guidelines 
provided by the WHO and CDC. The OEHN should closely monitor these 
changes and update the preparedness plan accordingly. To ensure the plan can be 
effectively implemented and test the organization's preparedness, companies 
should practice the plan by engaging in periodic exercises that involve all key 
stakeholders who would be impacted by a pandemic. 
The OEHN may be required to take a leading role in plan development, 
testing, and implementation, and can be a valuable asset to the company by 
ensuring that employees understand the potential health risks involved and are 
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knowledgeable about ways to help mitigate this risk. The scope of practice for 
health care professionals such as nurses and pharmacists may also need to 
temporarily expand during a pandemic to include the responsibility of diagnosing 
and treating patients with flu-like symptoms to help manage the overwhelming 
health needs of the public. 
Multiple employment policies and regulations at the local, state, and 
national level will need review and possible revisions to include exceptions 
during a pandemic. Once a pandemic vaccine is developed, policy makers will 
need to determine to whom and when the vaccine will be administered as the 
initial supply of vaccine is expected to be limited. The pre-pandemic vaccine that 
has been developed based on the current strains ofH5Nl virus require two 
injections to build adequate immunity. Should an avian influenza pandemic 
emerge in the near future, policy makers would need to decide if the limited 
supply of vaccine should be administered as recommended to develop adequate 
immunity (two doses), or if the vaccine should be given as one dose which would 
result in a lower immunity response but could be provided to twice the number of 
people. Decisions like these will be difficult but necessary to address the needs of 
the population during a major health crisis. 
Further Research 
The challenge of this deadly virus has researchers constantly looking for 
new ways of detecting virus mutation, discovery and development of medications 
to treat the virus, and other opportunities to mitigate the risk of a world wide 
spread of this health crisis. Until this research provides new and innovative ways 
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to address the health crisis, the OEHN must be diligent in efforts towards 
preparedness through prevention and public health initiatives that are realistic and 
grounded in the principles of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. 
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APPENDIX A 
PANDEMIC FLU PLANNING CHECKLIST FOR INDIVIDUALS & 
FAMILIES 
Flu Planning 
tor IndiViduals & Families 
You can:prepanHor an influenza pandemic naw. You should knaitJ both the magnitude 
of what em happen during_ a p:andemic outbneak and what actions you can IDke to help 
lessen the fmpactof an Influenza ~ndernic on you and your family. This checklistw11! 
help you_gather the information and resources you may_ neOOJn ca~e of a flu pandemic._ 
l. To plan fur apamlemic: 
0 Store a' t>.No we:ek supply ot_ \'late~ and food. During a pandemic, if you cannot get 
to a store1 o_rlf stor6!S oll'e out of supplies, ltwill be imp:Jrtantfol' you to have extra 
supplies on hand. This can be useful in othe1·typas or emergencit;!s, such as powe1' 
outages and disasters. 
Ask )'"'OUr doctor and _lnsUI'Zince company if you cr~n get an extra supply of you1· 
regular prescription 'drugs. 
Ha\.'G nonpt:e~Tiption drugs:_and ather he<llth supplies-on hand~ fnclucling pain I'E!-
Ii@I'€!1S,._ stomach remedies.. cough and-cold rnedidnes_ fluids with electrolytes., and 
vitamins~ 
Talk with family mernbers and loved ones _aOOut how they v .. ould be carEd 'to1· if' they 
got .sick,. Ol'wilatwill be nee'ded to cat't2 for the1n in your home. 
0_ Volunteei'With local gt'OUps to pl'e!pare and assist with ~mergency t•espon.<ie. 
Get involved in you1· community as it 'A!Drks to prepare foJ' an i'n11uenz:a pandemic. 
2. To limit the spread of germs and prevent infection: 
Teach_your children to wash hands ft't2quentlyw1tl1 soap and water, and model the 
cut'l'e!nt behavior. 
TeaCh yoUI' children to ~aver coughs and sneezes with tissues~ and be sure to model 
that behavio1·. 
0 Teach your children to stay away from others as much as possible of they are sick. 
Stay-home fi'Om work and school if sick. 
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3. Items to have on fwnd for an I!J>(tended stay at !lome: 
Exiill1piR< <>1 fo.od ami non-perlsnablos 
0 Roady, to-eat canned moats, fish, 
fruits, vegetables, b.ans, and soups 
ProOOin o1·-fruit bats 
Dry corea! Ol' granola 
Pe.nnut butter or nuts 
Driod Fluit 
0 Crnckers 
Canned juices 
Bottled wator 
CJ Cannod Ol' ]an·ed baby food ami 
fo1rnula 
Pot food 
Source: CDC (2006f, October). 
Examples of m•dlcal, heidth, and 
ern<>rgency ruppllos 
Prescrtbtd mildiCJI supplies such as 
gluco~-and blood-pi'@S.SUre monito1·ing 
equipment 
Soap and watel', or alcohol-based 
(60-95%) hand wosh 
Medicines for fuvlf!fJ such as 
acetaminophen Ol' ibuprofen 
Thermometel' 
Anti-diart'eal medication 
Vitamins 
Fluids \Vith elecb'Olytes 
Cleansing agont!soap 
Flashlight 
Bath~1·ie.s 
Portable ~>dio 
MJnual can opener 
Ga1bage bags 
Tissues,. toilet paper, disposable diapets 
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APPENDIXB 
SAMPLE EMPLOYEE HEALTH PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PLAN 
Sample Employee Health 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan: 
(Insert Country Name) 
(Insert Plan Point of Contact) 
(Insert Country Sponsor) 
(Insert Date) 
(Insert Review Date: plan date + 1 year) 
Country Plan Reviewed by: 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS OF COUNTRY PROGRAMME ELEMENTS 
1. Executive Summary 
2. Objective and Scope 
3. Roles and Responsibilities 
4. Employee Health Pandemic Planning Team (PPT) and Plan 
5. Seasonal Flu and Travel Health 
6. Antiviral Ordering, Storage, Prescribing, and Distribution 
7. Pandemic Vaccine Storage, Prescribing, Distribution, and Administration 
8. Staff, Operations, and Communications Plans 
9. Requested Plan Exceptions 
I 0. Solutions to be Shared 
11. Certification Statement 
ATTACHMENT 1: Country X Timeline of Key Actions 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This section provides an overview of the specific elements of the (Company X) 
Employee Health Pandemic Preparedness Plan: 
Insert a brief (no more than one page summary of the following): 
D Planowner 
D Link to COMPANY X Corporate Crisis Management Team, country 
business continuity and crisis management plans and teams with 
team chairpersons 
D Key plan elements (number of covered persons and essential daily 
jobs, employee locations/sites, seasonal flu vaccine, antiviral storage 
locations, plans for prescribing and distributing antivirals and vaccine, 
site closure decisions) 
D Communication plan to ensure that messages are consistent in and 
outside COMPANY X and respond to media, product and employee 
health related questions. 
D Timeline for key triggers and actions corresponding to WHO alert 
levels 
2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
This document describes the (Company X) Plan, key requirements, and other 
considerations needed to protect the workforce in an influenza pandemic. In 
addition, it describes requested exceptions to the plan and includes a certification 
statement from, (insert senior manager), indicating that a country plan meeting all 
core (Company X) requirements is in place. 
This will be used by (Company X) General Managers, Site Directors, Pandemic 
Planning Team, and Crisis Management Teams to establish, review and execute 
(Country X's) procedures to manage the workforce impact of a flu pandemic. It 
describes actions, triggers, and communications within and between (Country X) 
in WHO Phases 3, 4, 5 and 6 of a pandemic (Appendix 1). It has built in the 
following (Country X's) global principles: 
• comply with all relevant laws on prescribing and distribution (e.g., 
registration, etc.), and collaborate with local public health 
authorities during a pandemic; 
• assume no significant support will be available from the public 
health system in a pandemic; 
• maximize the use of established business processes wherever 
possible; 
• cover current employees and their families as well as locally 
identified groups of contingent workers essential to (Country X's) 
business continuity; and 
• incorporate anti-viral access (AV's) and other recommended 
public health measures. 
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3 ROLES & RESPONSffiiLITIES 
COUNTRY 
During Phase 3 and 4 of a pandemic: 
The (Country X's) General Manager (or other senior country business manager) 
is accountable for developing and implementing all aspects of (Country X's) 
Employee Health Pandemic Plan. 
(Insert other key local groups as appropriate who will deliver important portions 
of the plan such as warehousing/logistics, evaluation and prescribing of 
antivirals/vaccine, IT, HR, and Finance). 
During Phases 5 & 6 of a pandemic: 
• Local Crisis Management Team will implement detailed action plans, deal 
with day-to-day questions and implement local measures in synchronization with 
Corporate Crisis Management Team (CCMT) and local governments. 
• Communications will be responsible for providing clear and consistent 
messages to every business inside each country. 
(Insert other key local groups as appropriate who will deliver various portions of 
the plan such as evaluation and prescribing of antivirals/vaccine, delivery of 
vaccine, communications, workforce redeployment, management of site sickness 
absence and other policies). 
KEY GLOBAL RESPONSffiiLITES 
During Phase 3 and 4 of a pandemic: 
• Employee Health Management will develop and implement the Global 
Employee Health Pandemic Plan and tools. 
• GMS will deliver AV (antivirals) supply and manage the above country 
logistics of both the regional "urgent use" A V stockpiles and shipment of 
antivirals to create in-country A V stockpiles. 
• Corporate Communications will provide clear and consistent messages. 
• Global Internal Audit, Employee Health Management/Corporate Environment 
Health & Safety will audit local employee health pandemic plans. 
During Phases 5 & 6 of a pandemic: 
• Employee Health Management will advise CCMT on appropriate actions and 
develop employee communications in conjunction with Corporate 
Communications. 
• CCMT!Corp Communications will update (Country X) countries on corporate 
activities and provide templates for local communications. 
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4 Employee Health Pandemic Planning Team (PPT) and Plan 
The planning team represented all in-country (Country X) business units, Human 
Resources, Employee Health, Communications, and other relevant group. It 
considered all core (Country X) plan requirements, local regulation, and relevant 
government plans to ensure alignment where applicable. 
(Insert team charter or describe the country planning team scope and 
membership). 
The overall plan is linked to the existing Country Crisis Management Team 
(CMT) and Site CMT, which will deliver the Country's Employee Health 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan if needed. The Country CMT will be headed by 
(insert senior business leader) during the pandemic in order to make rapid 
decisions that cross multiple business areas. The Country CMT will include an 
Employee Health Medical representative (insert position) to advise during a 
pandemic. Site crisis and recovery plans will be managed by site crisis 
management teams. The GM has designated (insert name) as the country owner 
of the Employee Health Pandemic Plan. (insert name) will be responsible for 
annual review and update of the plan as circumstances change. 
5 Seasonal Flu and Travel Health Programmes 
The Country plan also does/does not provide access to aunual seasonal flu vaccine 
programmes for all employees and key contractors 
(Insert completed flu vaccine programme template or equivalent if applicable). 
Seasonal flu vaccination is provided to all (Country X) international travellers. A 
travel health programme, linked to the business travel process, is in place. This 
programme provides travel health assessments, access to First Assist, travel 
advice, and access to antiviral medications (e.g., Relenza/Tamiflu) where an 
assessment has indicated a significant risk. It also includes local procedures for 
management of employees who may be travelling or returning from travel to 
affected areas at the start of a pandemic and prohibits international travel to 
affected areas when recommended by CCMT. 
(Insert completed travel health programme template or equivalent if applicable). 
6 Antiviral Ordering, Storage, Prescribing and Distribution 
A. Registrations and Shipment 
The team has reviewed current antiviral registration status for Relenza & Tamiflu 
and (check all that apply). 
0 Relenza is licensed and approved for treatment use 
0 Relenza filing is in progress and approval is expected in: __ _ 
0 Relenza is not approved will need alternate method for distribution 
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0 Tamiflu is approved and can be directly imported 
0 Other: Please explain ___________ _ 
The plan has identified employees, key complimentary workers, and "daily 
essential" employees required to maintain business operations by location and 
function during a pandemic. Family members have also been identified as defined 
by the plan. The plan makes one treatment pack available to every current 
(Country X) employee, key contractor, and employees' family member as 
specified in the country's plan. 
(Insert a workforce deployment plan if applicable). 
Total# of Current Employees 
Total# of family members 
Total# of key contractors 
Other covered persons (please explain) 
TOTAL PERSONS COVERED BY PLAN 
COUNTRY ANTIVIRAL ALLOCATION BY CORPORATE 
Note: Totals which are more than 5% different from initial targets will need to be 
explained in the Plan Exceptions section (9). 
B. Storage 
A central location meeting GMP requirements for initial receipt and storage of 
antivirals has been identified and will be used until Phase 4 of a pandemic. 
During Phase 4, shipment to additional local locations to support prescribing and 
distribution will begin. Large or small (less than 50 packs) country stockpiles will 
be stored as required by the (Country X) plan. 
C. Prescribing and Distribution 
The prescribing and dispensing processes used are in compliance with applicable 
local laws and includes all covered groups (e.g., family and employees). The 
Country plan calls for A V distribution from country stockpiles to covered persons 
to be initiated in Phase 5 of a pandemic. A V use for treatment or prevention will 
be initiated only after CCMT, in consultation with EHM and local Crisis 
Management Team, has approved use in our country. The proposed prescribing 
process, inclusive of record keeping and informed consent is described in: 
(Insert the prescribing and dispensing plan). 
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7 Pandemic Vaccine Storage, Prescribing, Distribution, and 
Administration 
While the current plan does not include specific references to pandemic priming 
or pandemic vaccine, every effort will be made to provide access to them if and 
when a safe and effective vaccine is developed. Vaccine will require different 
storage and distribution (e.g. standard 2-8 C cold chain) and administration 
approach (administered by a health professional and not taken as an oral 
medication) than antivirals. Thus, it is prudent to develop, in advance, a plan for 
storage, prescribing, and distribution, and administration of vaccine. Insert an 
overview of the country plan here. 
8 Staff, Operations, and Communication Plans 
Staff and operational plans which address the key requirements are in place and 
includes: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
identification of those sites/operations which will likely close when a 
pandemic is locally active and those sites/operations which will remain 
open during the entire pandemic. 
decision points for when to reopen sites which are temporarily closed . 
the plan to provide appropriate infection control supplies (e.g., hand 
cleaning products, tissues, respirators for select groups, etc. 
appropriate access restriction and "social distancing" measures . 
measures to manage people who have been exposed to pandemic flu, 
those who become ill while at the worksite, and to how to ensure safe 
return to work of staff following pandemic illness. 
a remote working contingency plan . 
the phase in and phase out of any changes in relevant HR processes 
(e.g., payroll) and polices on flexible working, bereavement, 
compensation, sickness absence, etc. 
a communications plan with pandemic-related activation/termination 
links to the CCMT and local BCP, key contacts (with backups), chain 
of communications, multiple local communication channels (e.g., 
hotline, web site), local sources for timely and reliable pandemic and 
public health information, and key messages by pandemic stage. 
triggers for deactivating the overall country plan . 
(Insert applicable staff, operations and communication plans if applicable). 
9 Plan Exceptions 
No exceptions to the core requirements of the plan are requested. 
Or, the following plan exceptions are requested (these are examples-please 
explain any requests): 
0 Total antiviral allocation more than 5% greater than initial Corporate 
allocation 
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D Multiple initial warehouse locations required for country stockpile 
D Earlier distribution (before phase 5) of antivirals to selected groups of 
employees/family. Please describe 
D Seasonal flu vaccine programme will not be implemented. 
Please explain any required exceptions: 
10 Solutions to be Shared within Country X 
Please insert any tools or solutions that your team has developed in their work 
which may benefit other (Country X) countries preparing for a pandemic. 
(Not Applicable or Insert Tools Here). 
11 Certification Statement 
I have reviewed and supported the planning process and I certify that all of the 
key requirements of the (Country X) global employee health pandemic 
preparedness plan are in place. This plan will be reviewed annually; we will 
contact the EHM account manager and GMS for any 5% increase or more in 
covered persons. 
Name 
I request that the following amount of antivirals: 
____ Packs Relenza and Product Information 
____ Packs Tamiflu Capsules and Product Information 
____ Packs Tamiflu Suspension and Product Information 
Date 
be shipped to the attention of the individual named below at the following 
(Country X) defined location as soon as sufficient quantities are available: 
Name: 
Address: 
Source: GlaxoSmithKiine Employee Health Management (2006a). 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
COUNTRY X TIMELINE OF KEY ACTIONS 
Sample actions are listed below; please outline key actions and persons 
responsible under the country plan 
WHO Phase 3: No or very limited evidence of human-to-human transmission 
Pandemic alert Phase 3 is our principle planning and preparation 
time and the following actions are critical. ModifY actions and 
responsibilities as required. 
Action Responsibility 
• Form pandemic team, assess preparedness, PharmaGM& 
infrastructure needs, identify essential daily Country Employee 
employees, families, relevant laws, A V registration Health Pandemic 
status, etc. Team 
• Finalise local plan based on key (Country X) GM&Country 
requirements and submit to Corp EHM and GMS for Employee Health 
approval Pandemic Team 
• Central storage of country allocation of antivirals. Insert 
• Partial activation of (Country X) web site, EHM, Corp Comms, 
communications cascade to employees about core Country Management 
plan elements & Communications 
• HR system in place to fully define Insert 
employment/family status 
• Progress seasonal flu vaccine campaigns and routine Insert 
travel health programmes 
• Insert Other Key Actions Insert 
Phase 4: Evidence of increased human-to-human transmission 
When WHO raises the pandemic alert to Phase 4 through government 
or public communication, the following actions will be taken. ModifY 
actions and responsibilities as required 
Action Responsibility 
• Review country plan, assess readiness, and close Insert 
gaps. Tabletop exercise of plan 
• Gather needed resources (EH, supplies) and test Insert 
systems for local A V distribution. 
• Distribute central country stockpiles to other sites (if Insert 
needed) (to "hub" or other local distribution sites) 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
"Remote" groups (e.g., field sales in US): activate 
evaluation, prescription network and dispense A V's 
to "remote" groups if approved. No A V use at this 
time unless pandemic flu is locally active. 
Regular communication updates and training as 
needed 
Progress seasonal flu vaccine campaigns, routine 
travel health programmes, pneumococcal vaccine for 
high risk persons 
Physically separate company stockpile from 
commercially available material 
Assess the overall local preparedness and consider 
request to CCMT for A V distribution from regional 
"urgent use" stockpiles 
Insert Other Key Actions 
Insert 
Corporate 
Communications 
and Insert 
Insert 
Insert 
Insert 
Insert 
Phase 5: Evidence of significant human-to-human transmission (in a single 
village, location, or country) 
When WHO raises the pandemic alert to Phase 5 through government 
or public communication, the CCMT together with EHM and 
Corporate Communications will inform all (Country X) countries, 
GMs, and Site Managers and the following actions are critical: 
Description 
• Review (or fully implement) country plan. 
• Activate evaluation, prescribing, and 
distribution networks. Distribute A V' s to ALL 
remaining employees and families. A V use 
OK' din affected areas. Country registry 
established. No A V use in non-affected 
countries 
• Review (or implement) site emergency and 
closure plans, HR policies, IT, etc. 
• Implement (Country X) travel restrictions to 
affected countries 
• Communication to employees with full 
activation of web site/cascades, including: 
o last phase of pandemic alert 
o synchronization of (Country X) and govt 
information to employees 
o initiate measures as detailed in their 
pandemic plans 
o weekly updates ( e-mails I website) 
Responsibility 
Insert 
EHM/Corp Comms 
Country CMT and Site 
Teams 
Insert 
Global travel/EHM 
Corporate 
Communications 
-to local 
communications 
-to GMs 
- to local Relenza and 
vaccine teams 
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• Local communication to employees per intranet, 
e-mail and on message boards and other local 
channels 
• Review of the situation by CCMT and periodic 
updates/information to country CMT. 
• Assess the overall local preparedness and 
consider: 
o request to CCMT for A V distribution 
from regional "urgent use" stockpiles 
o providing daily prophylaxis for persons 
in "essential daily" jobs. 
• Insert Other Key Actions 
Insert 
CCMT /EHM/Relenza 
Coordination Team 
Country CMT, CCMT 
Insert 
5.4 Phase 6: Pandemic-Efficient and sustained human-to-human 
transmission 
This is the stage to fully activate local plans when pandemic flu is locally active. 
Description Responsibility 
• Implement site emergency (or closure) plans Insert 
when flu locally active. 
• Check status of other preventive measures 
vaccine, etc. 
• Communication to countries on the following 
• 
items: 
o updates from WHO 
o need to liaise with local governments 
o countries to initiate their pandemic plans 
o information to employees (time/content) 
In Country communication to employees via 
intranet site, e-mail, message board, call centre: 
o information on next steps: 
o personal measures to reduce infection/ 
transmission 
o who/what jobs are critical and 
responsibilities 
o who should stay at home 
o when to initiate treatment 
o prophylaxis for "essential daily" workers 
to be considered 
o point to website to support information 
• Issue regular press updates on supply, 
production, emerging resistance, to external 
stakeholders, etc 
• Assess the overall local preparedness and 
consider request to CCMT for A V distribution 
from regional "urgent use" stockpiles. 
• Notify CCMT of country business status, use of 
Insert 
Corporate 
Communications to: 
• local communications 
• GMs 
• local Relenza and 
vaccine teams 
Local Communications 
based on templates 
provided by Corporate 
Communications/EHM 
Corporate 
Communications/ Relenza 
Coordination team 
Insert 
Insert 
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stockpile, sickness absence/death rates, 
additional need for antivirals, etc 
• Insert Other Key Actions Insert 
Key for abbreviations used: CCMT=Corporate Crisis Management Team, EHM=Employee 
Health Management, GMS=Global Manufactnring and Supply, GM=General Manager, Country 
CMT=Country Crisis Management Team 
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PURPOSE 
APPENDIXC 
PANDEMUCPREPAREDNESSPLANNING 
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION TOOLKIT 
To provide guidance and tools to meet the respirator requirements of a 
Global Employee Health Pandemic Preparedness Plan and to assist in the 
effective selection and use of respirators during a flu pandemic. 
SCOPE 
The plan requirements and guidance apply to all operations. The 
respirator program elements should be applied to all locations. Some measures 
can also be used at home to reduce the risk of disease transmission. 
EMPLOYEEHEALTHPANDEMUCPREPAREDNESSPLAN 
REQUIREMENTS 
• The routine use of surgical masks by asymptomatic persons is not 
recommended because they have not been demonstrated to reduce the risk of 
infection. It is recommended that symptomatic persons suspected to have 
pandemic flu use surgical masks until they can be escorted from the work site 
or while in transit/at their home. 
• Respirators are to be used only for those persons who may be asked to 
medically evaluate or transport individuals infected with known or suspected 
pandemic flu. This will typically include: first aiders and medical staffs. 
Country plans should consider purchase and storage of respirators in advance 
as supplies are likely to be limited in a pandemic. Generally, FFP2 type (or 
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US N95) respirators are adequate, but the final choice of respirators will vary 
depending on the degree of protection required. 
• Country plans must provide appropriate respirators (N95 or FFP2) and other 
protective equipment to persons involved in jobs with high exposure risk (e.g., 
unavoidable travel to health care facilities, procurement of eggs for flu 
vaccine manufacture if relevant, etc.). 
INTRODUCTION 
During an influenza pandemic, coughing and sneezing will be the main 
source of spread from person to person. Coughing and sneezing by infected 
persons can create aerosol droplets of respiratory secretions containing flu virus 
which remain airborne for an extended time. Respirators are designed to reduce, 
but will not entirely eliminate, the risk of exposure to these airborne viruses. The 
use of surgical masks (which are NOT respirators) by persons suspected to be 
infected with pandemic flu until they can be escorted from the site is also an 
important control. 
To assist in implementing these programmes, this tool has been developed 
and is divided into the following sections: 
• Identification of groups of persons at high risk of aerosol exposures 
• Respirator selection/recommended models 
• Advance purchase ofRPE or surgical masks and storage 
• Use and cleaning 
• Surgical masks in the workplace 
• Use of surgical masks and respirators in transit and at home 
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• Timeline 
IDENTIFICATION OF GROUPS OF PERSONS AT HIGH RISK FOR 
AEROSOL EXPOSURES 
A first step should be to identify the following groups and estimate the 
overall number of employees in each group: 
• Security personnel who may interact with members of the public or staff 
who are known or suspected to have pandemic flu; 
• Cleaning personnel who may handle potentially contaminated equipment 
or clean infected areas where there is potential for aerosol generation; 
• All supporting staff, including security, first aiders, or others who may 
be asked to escort persons who are known or suspected to have 
pandemic flu off the work site; 
• Healthcare personnel or first aiders who are providing direct patient 
healthcare services to persons known or suspected to have pandemic flu; 
• Employees with unavoidable work -related travel to health care facilities 
which provide care to persons infected with pandemic flu; 
• Other jobs which have been determined to have significant aerosol 
exposure risk. 
This information will guide the advance purchase of respirators and 
surgical masks and ensure that appropriate respirators and supporting programmes 
are in place during high risk activities. 
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RESPIRATOR SELECTION/RECOMMENDED MODELS 
At a minimum, the World Health Organisation recommends one of the 
following types of respirators for persons at high risk of exposure to pandemic (or 
other) flu virus: 
• European CE certified EN143 P2/ EN 149 FFP2; 
• US NIOSH certified N-95; or 
• Comparable national/regional particulate respirators WITHOUT 
exhalation valves. (Specific examples and pictures of these 
respirators are provided in Attachment 1 ). 
The 3M Company is a global provider of respirators and usually offers 
competitive pricing. More protective particulate respirators (e.g., N-99 or FFP 3) 
may also be used, but can be considerably more expensive and complex to use. 
Regardless of model, multiple sizes of the same respirator model should be 
purchased (if available) to ensure a good fit across a wide range of face shapes 
and sizes. Respirators with exhalation valves should NEVER be used because 
they promote the spread virus from infected persons who may wear them but have 
not yet developed symptoms. 
Many FFP2 and 3 respirators do not effectively protect persons with facial 
hair because a proper seal can not be achieved. Consideration should be given to 
obtaining powered air purifying respirators for these persons if removing facial 
hair is not an option. 
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ADVANCE PURCHASE AND STORAGE OF RPE AND/OR SURGICAL 
MASKS 
After the number of persons and scope of tht; RPE program has been 
determined, advance purchase and storage of a sufficient supply of recommended 
respirators and surgical masks are recommended. 
A reasonable approach to advance purchase of respirators is to obtain 
recommended models in quantities sufficient to provide all high risk persons with 
one clean respirator daily for two - six work week periods during a pandemic - or 
60 disposable respirators per covered person. Multiple sizes of the same model 
should be purchased where available. The final number of respirators purchased is 
at the discretion of the country pandemic planning team and will depend on the 
number of high exposure risk jobs, an assessment of the likely limitations oflocal 
supply in the event of a pandemic, cost, and other factors. A respirator will 
require medical clearance, proper selection, and fit to be maximally effective; 
these steps are detailed below. Respirators purchased in advance should be 
stored on the sites where they will be used. It is recommended that they be stored 
in a secure and locked area with limited access to prevent theft. 
A reasonable approach to advance purchase of surgical masks is to buy 
enough to provide one surgical mask for 50% of the local population; the 
cumulative attack rate during multiple waves of a flu pandemic is not expected to 
exceed 30% and the excess will provide sufficient coverage for situations where 
flu infection status is unclear. The final number of surgical masks purchased is at 
the discretion of the country pandemic planning team and will depend on the 
72 
number of persons and visitors in a country, an assessment of the likely 
limitations of local supply in the event of a pandemic, cost, and other factors. 
There are no fit testing or medical clearance requirements for surgical 
masks; they can be used by anyone. Surgical masks purchased in advance should 
be stored on the sites where they will be used. It is recommended that they be 
stored in a secure and locked area with limited access to prevent theft. 
USE, CLEANING, AND DISPOSAL 
Respirator fit is very important. If a respirator does not seal properly to 
the face, airborne flu virus will enter under or around the face piece seal and into 
the nose and lungs. A good fit can only be obtained if the following conditions 
are met: 
• The face is clean shaven where the respirator seal meets the face; 
beards, moustaches or stubble can interfere with a good seal and cause 
leakage. 
• A minimum of 2-3 sizes and types are made available to provide an 
effective fit for faces of different shapes. 
• The individual must be fitted and tested using the actual respirator 
model that they will wear. This must involve an individual qualitative 
or quantitative fit test by an experienced professional. 
• Individuals with a compromised respiratory system, such as asthma or 
emphysema, or people with a history of heart disease should consult 
EH or a physician before selecting/wearing a respirator. 
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• The user carefully follows recommended donning and removal 
instructions. 
• The user performs a seal check or fit check each time the respirator is 
put on and prior to use in a high risk environment. 
• The respirator is worn the entire time in the high risk environment. 
• Disposable respirators should never be shared. Disposable respirators 
should never be cleaned and reused. Once worn, the respirator should 
be considered contaminated. It should be disposed of: I) at the end of 
the shift; 2) at the end of the work day; or 3) if it becomes visibly 
contaminated at any time during the day. 
• Reusable respirators (e.g., those with cartridges and Yz face rubber 
seals for example) may be disinfected using a 1% solution of sodium 
hypochlorite (made with a 1:5 solution of hospital grade bleach and 
water respectively). Appropriate hand washing should be performed 
immediately after the removal of all PPE because this is a common 
source of contamination and infection. 
SURGICAL MASKS IN THE WORKPLACE 
Surgical masks are not respirators and do not reduce the risk of 
INHALING virus particles. Surgical masks are specifically designed to help 
prevent aerosols or biological particles from being EXHALED into the 
environment. They do not seal tightly to the face and therefore air leakages 
around the edges are certain. 
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Surgical masks are useful in preventing an infected person from creating a 
cloud of aerosol droplets during coughing or sneezing. Persons suspected of 
having pandemic influenza should be separated from others and asked to wear a 
surgical mask for the entire time they remain at the work site. If a surgical mask is 
not available, tissues should be provided and these persons should be advised to 
cover their mouth and nose when coughing. 
USE OF SURGICAL MASKS AT HOME OR IN TRANSIT 
Employees should generally be discouraged from taking mass transit 
during a pandemic. They are encouraged to commute alone in personal 
automobiles or use other means (e.g., motorbikes, bicycles) to get to work. If the 
use of mass transit is unavoidable, individuals should follow social distancing 
guidelines and any recommendation of local public health authorities. Generally, 
surgical masks offer no or at best, unproven protection against the risk of getting 
seasonal or pandemic flu. 
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TIMELINE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION BY PANDEMIC PHASE 
WHOPhase3 WH0Phase4 WHO PhaseS WH0Phase6 
1. Select desired 1. Review 1. Review 1. Review 
respirators and guidelines with guidelines with guidelines with 
surgical masks EH and local EH and local EH and local 
based on minimum Public Health Public Health Public Health 
requirements, local authorities as authorities as authorities as 
availability, and required. required. required. 
pnce. 
2. Identify high 2. Conduct 2. Complete 2. At sites which 
exposure risk training, medical training, medical remain open, 
persons and clearance, and fit clearance, and fit utilize respirators 
estimate numbers testing for likely testing for likely and surgical 
of respirators and RPEusers. RPE users. masks as 
surgical masks recommended by 
required. country PPT and 
local Public 
Health 
authorities. 
3. Procure needed 3. Review 3. Review 3. Authorize 
respirators and adequacy of adequacy of home use. 
surgical masks. stocks and make stocks and release 
additional stocks as needed. 
purchases if 
needed. 
4. Select secure 4. If pandemic flu 4. If pandemic flu 4. If pandemic flu 
storage area near is locally active, is locally active, is locally active, 
points of use. implement implement implement 
respirator and respirator and respirator and 
surgical mask surgical mask surgical mask 
plans for plans for plans for 
employees and employees (e.g., employees (e.g., 
dependents (if security, cleaning, security, cleaning, 
applicable). EH, etc.) and EH, etc.) and 
dependents (if dependents (if 
apjJlicable ). applicable). 
5. Consider 5. Communicate 5. Communicate 5. Communicate 
advance training, to employees and to employees and to employees and 
medical clearance, dependents (if dependents. dependents. 
and fit testing of applicable). 
likely RPE users. 
Source: GlaxoSmithKline Employee Health Management (2006b ). 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF RESPIRATORS 
(Types of N95/ FFP2 respirators without exhalation valves) 
3M Model1860S 3M Model9210 
3M Model8810 Moldex Model 2490 
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PURPOSE 
APPENDIXD 
PANDEMUCPREPAREDNESSPLANNING 
SOCIAL DISTANCING TOOLKIT 
To provide guidance and tools to implement site access control and social 
distancing interventions which work with sickness absence programs, antivirals 
and vaccine to minimize the risk of transmission of pandemic influenza. Country 
pandemic planning teams should use this information to develop appropriate local 
site operation and meeting policies. 
SCOPE 
This guidance applies to all company operations. The social distancing 
measures described should be applied to all employees, families, contract 
workers, and visitors. Some measures can also be used at home to reduce the risk 
of disease transmission. 
EMPLOYEE HEALTH PANDEMUC PLAN REQUIREMENTS 
• Country plans must identify those sites/operations which must remain open 
during a pandemic (unless superseded by local authorities). At these sites, 
additional actions will be needed to reduce the risk of infected persons 
entering the site, such as: posting prominent notices at entry points, advising 
staff not to enter if they have symptoms of flu, etc. 
• Sites which remain open in a pandemic must implement a system of specific 
social distancing measures. These measures must be implemented during 
78 
phase 5 (if pandemic is locally active) or at all sites which remain open during 
Phase 6. 
INTRODUCTION 
During an influenza pandemic, measures to increase social distance may 
be instituted or recommended by the public health authorities. These measures, 
which include closure of schools and restricting mass gatherings such as concerts, 
are intended to prevent transmission of influenza between people. In the work 
setting, social distancing and other policies will reduce the risk of ill persons 
entering a company site or reduce contact between potentially ill staff and 
visitors. This tool is divided into the following sections: 
• Restricting Access to Company Sites. 
• Implementing Appropriate Policies 
• Personal Hygiene Policies 
• Appendices with Tools 
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO COMPANY SITES 
I) Each site which will remain open when a pandemic is locally active 
should appoint security, employee health, reception, and other appropriate 
staff (including adequate back-up to allow for absence) to implement access 
restrictions at the site. This group should have ongoing communication with 
the site crisis management team (CMT). 
2) Appointed persons should manage, in consultation with the site CMT, 
all access-related issues upon activation of the site emergency response plan. 
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3) Upon activation of the site emergency plan, appointed staff should take 
the following actions: 
• Re-evaluate (and implement if appropriate) temperature, thermographic 
imaging, or other forms of screening based on the most recent local 
public health gnidance and known information about the pandemic flu 
VITUS. 
• Reduce the number of staff and visitor entrances and access points to the 
minimum number possible while still meeting operational, security, and 
EHS needs. 
• Prominently post notices at all entry points to facility, advising staff and 
visitors not to enter if they have symptoms of influenza (Attachment 1). 
• Train security/reception personnel on site access restrictions, how to 
identify persons potentially ill with pandemic flu, and the steps for 
managing interactions with potentially ill persons. 
• Equip staff at entrances with adequate supplies of tissues, medical and 
hand hygiene products, N95 or equivalent respirators, and cleaning 
supplies required for their interactions with potentially infectious visitors 
or employees. 
• Provide appropriate supplies of tissues, hygiene products, and surgical 
masks for use by potentially infectious visitors or employees. 
4) Upon activation of the site emergency plan, appointed persons should 
advise employees not to come to work if they are feeling unwell, 
particularly if they are experiencing influenza symptoms. It would be useful 
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to advise staff ofthe difference in symptoms between influenza and the 
common cold. Staff who are ill should stay at home until symptoms resolve. 
5) Use normal communication methods to ensure that all staff receives 
notices. 
6) The appointed persons should determine, in consultation with local 
public health and site CMTs, when to reduce or eliminate site access 
restrictions as a pandemic wanes. 
IMPLEMENTING APROPRIATE SITE MEETING, SOCIAL 
DISTANCING, AND PERSONAL HYGIENE MEASURES 
1) Comply with all advice and restrictions implemented by local public 
health authorities in your country regarding social distancing measures in 
the community. 
2) Review all workplace activities that involve employees (and 
complementary workers) working in communal areas. Discontinue all non-
essential activities in these areas and exclude employees from working in 
these areas. These areas may include: 
• Open plan offices • Meeting rooms 
• Laboratories • Production areas 
• Warehouses • Workshops 
• Catering areas 
3) Cease all face to face meetings and maximize the use of technology to 
conduct business such as teleconferencing I videoconferencing I sametime 
meetings - even when participants are in the same building. 
81 
• If a face-to-face meeting with people is unavoidable, minimize the 
meeting time, choose a large meeting room and sit at least one meter 
away from each other if possible. Consider holding meetings in the 
open air. 
4) Review occupational travel activities including employee travel from 
home to work. 
• Cease all travel on public and company owned mass transport systems 
including aircraft, trains and busses. 
• Advise employees to use single person transportation means to travel 
to and from work. 
5) Review work patterns: 
• If possible, arrange for employees to work from home or work variable 
hours to avoid crowding at the workplace. 
• Practice "ghost" shift changes wherever possible, with the shift going 
off duty leaving the workplace before the new shift enters. If possible, 
leave an interval before re-occupation of the workplace. If possible, 
thoroughly ventilate the workplace between shifts by opening doors 
and windows or turning up the fan speed/increasing air exchanges on 
the ventilation system. 
• Set up systems where clients I customers can pre-order I request 
information via phone I email I fax and have order I information ready 
for fast pick-up or delivery; and 
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6) Educate staff regarding the transmission of influenza virus and the need 
to reduce risk by adopting infection control measures such as: 
• Reduce person-to-person contact via personal greetings e.g., hand-
shaking, kissing. 
• Maintain a distance of at least one meter should be maintained 
between persons when practical. Larger distances are more effective. 
• Avoid visiting or having other contact with unwell people. 
• Cover the nose I mouth when coughing or sneezing. 
• Use tissues to contain respiratory secretions. 
• Dispose oftissues or other contaminated materials in appropriate 
receptacles. 
• Perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions and 
contaminated objects or materials. 
• Minimize hand contact with potentially contaminated surfaces such as 
handrails, door handles, etc. 
• Bring lunch and eat at desk or away from others (avoid the cafeteria 
and crowded restaurants). Introduce staggered lunchtimes so numbers 
of people in the lunch room are reduced. 
• Do not congregate in tearooms or other areas where people socialize. 
Do what needs to be done and then leave the area. 
• Encourage staff to avoid recreational or other leisure classes I meetings 
etc. where they might come into contact with infectious people. 
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SCALING BACK SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES 
At some point the decision to discontinue social distancing measures will 
need to be taken. This decision (in consultation with local public health 
authorities) should be based on evidence of improving local I regional control, 
such as: 
• Consistent decrease in the number of new cases. 
• Reduction in the number of probable and known cases. 
• Effective protective countermeasures are in place (e.g., high coverage 
with a pandemic flu vaccine). 
REINFORCING PERSONAL HYGIENE MEASURES 
Basic personal hygiene measures should also be communicated to staff 
and they should be encouraged to practice them in the workplace to minimize 
potential influenza transmission. These measures should include: 
• cover nose and mouth when sneezing and coughing (preferably with a 
disposable single use tissue). 
• immediately dispose of used tissues. 
• adopt good handwashing I hand hygiene practices, particularly after 
coughing, sneezing, or using tissues. 
• keep hands away from the mucous membranes of the eyes, mouth, and 
nose. 
1) Nominated staff should ensure that adequate supplies ofhand hygiene 
products are available in restrooms, health centers, change rooms, and other 
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appropriate locations. This is a high planning priority as there may be 
interruption to the supply or shortages of soap and hand towels. 
2) Hand and personal hygiene information should be communicated to staff 
and visitors: 
• Post hygiene notices (Attachment 2) in all workplace entrances, 
washrooms, hand washing stations and public areas; and 
• Consider brochures, newsletters, global emails, employee notice 
boards, and information included with pay slips, to inform staff of the 
importance of hand hygiene and environmental cleaning during a 
pandemic. 
Source: GlaxoSmithKline Employee Health Management (2006c). 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
SAMPLE SITE ACCESS SIGN 
SITE ACCESS RESTRICTED: 
INFLUENZA 
Pandemic influenza is a contagious disease. In order to reduce the spread of 
Influenza at this site the following is required of ALL employees and visitors. 
Do not enter this site if you have: 
chills, shivering and a fever (temperature > 38°C) 
sore throat 
dry or significant cough 
difficulty breathing 
sneezing 
runny nose 
If some of the above apply to you, please go home and wait until you have recovered 
before returning to work. 
If you begin to feel ill at work or have recently arrived from business travel overseas, 
please call: 
Phone: ________________________ _ 
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ATTACHMENT 2 
SAMPLE SIGNS ON BASIC HYGIENE PRACTICES 
PROTECTING YOURSELF AND OTHERS AGAINST 
RESPIRATORY ILLNESS 
•!•HANDWASHING IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING YOU CAN 
DO TO PROTECT YOURSELF 
•!•Cover your nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing 
oUse a tissue and dispose of this once used in the waste 
oAiways wash hands after coughing and sneezing or disposing of 
tissues. 
•!•Keep your hands away from your mouth, nose and eyes. 
•!•Avoid contact with individuals at risk (e.g. small children or those with 
underlying or chronic illnesses such as immune suppression or lung disease) 
until influenza-like symptoms have resolved. 
•!•Avoid contact with people who have influenza-like symptoms. 
•!•Ask people to use a tissue and cover their nose and mouth when coughing 
or sneezing and to wash their hands afterwards. 
running watez 
fi-' ___;jj~-· 7,:~ "' ,_(I ,, 
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Hand Hygiene with Alcohol-based Hand 
Sanitizer 
1. Remove je-w-elry. 2. Rub hands together 3-. Rub in between 
Apply enough product: pal:ans to palms and around 
to open pabns.** fingers 
~ -  ~ ~~ 
4. Cover all surfaces of 5. Rub backs of hands 6. Rub fingertips 
the hands and fingers and fingers. Rub each o.f each hand in § thumb. opposite palm ~ ::_~~ ~ ,---~~:· ~ 
7. Keep rubbing until hands are dry. 
**The volume required to be effective varies f"ro:ID. product to 
product. Enough product to keep hands moist .for 15 seconds 
should be applied. 
Do no"t use these products '>\.'ith "'"'nt:e-r. Do not use paper to'\v-els t:o dry 
hands. 
Note: Wash hands with soap and water i:f hands are visibly dirty or 
contaminated w-ith blood or other body fluids. Certain 
manufacturers recom:rn.end washing hands with soap and 'Water a:fte:r 
5-10 applications of' gel. 
HAND HYGIENE 
The most important thing you can do to keep from getting sick is to wash your hands! 
Handwashing is the single most important measure to reduce the risks of transmitting infection 
from one person to another. 
Hand washing with soap and water, alcohol-based hand rub, or antiseptic handwash should be 
performed regularly throughout the day. Hands should be thoroughly dried, preferably using 
disposable tissues or towels. Use the disposable towel to open the door. 
Hand washing and drying should always be done after coughing, sneezing or handling used 
tissues or after touching objects, materials or hard surfaces that may have been contaminated 
by someone else. 
Hand-to-face contact such as can occur during eating, normal grooming, or smoking presents 
significant risks because of the potential for transmission of influenza from surfaces 
contaminated with wet respiratory droplets. Handwashing should always be done before and 
after eating, grooming, smoking or any other activity that involves hand-to-face contact. 
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APPENDIXE 
MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE FOR POTENTIAL PANDEMIC 
ILLNESS SCENARIOS 
This document contains management guidance which could be applicable 
during any of the phases of the pandemic and is meant to be a general guide of 
employee, manager, and local pandemic planning team actions. 
• Scenario l: No reported illness or exposure to pandemic flu 
• Scenario 2: Employee has had close contact with a confirmed Pandemic Flu 
patient 
• Scenario 3: Employee is confirmed to have Pandemic Flu 
• Scenario 4: Employee and/or Manager needs employee to travel to an infected 
area 
• Scenario 5: Employee comes to work ill or becomes ill at work 
Employee Action Items 
1. Read and understand Pandemic Flu Information (policy and plan) posted on 
company website 
2. Remain informed on status of pandemic flu in local area 
Manager Action Items 
1. Communicate up front company guiding principles - on pandemic flu. 
2. Encourage employee participation in Seasonal Influenza Program 
Employee Health 
I. Serve as medical advisor on pandemic planning. 
2. Assist country GMs in development of Country specific Pandemic Plans 
3. Identify key EH professional (and back -up individual) to lead business 
decisions regarding pandemic response. 
4. Plan and implement Seasonal Influenza Program 
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exposed to pandemic flu out side work place (traveling from pandemic 
area or exposed at home) 
Employee Action Items 
1. Do not come in to work. 
2. Seek medical assistance by consulting your physician or a medical facility or 
phone Company EH. 
3. Make individual decision of use of Antivirals (AV). 
4. Use sick leave from the moment employee suspects illness or arrange with 
your manager to work from home. 
5. Inform local EH or your manager and HR immediately if you are confirmed 
as Pandemic Flu patient. 
Manager Action Items 
1. Contact employee to gather urgent/ important deliverables to ensure a smooth 
work transition. 
2. If applicable, keep remaining team members informed ofthe situation. Keep 
identity of employee confidential to the extent feasible. 
3. Inform HR. 
4. Allow other employees within the impacted workgroup to work from home 
for period of up to 10 days if requested. 
5. Track employee absences related to flu pandemic add to immune status list. 
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Employee Health 
1. Provide telephonic consultative service (as needed) to employees on 
determination of cold vs. flu. 
2. Clear employee to RTW if no symptoms develop within 5 days post exposure. 
3. Think about use oflocal EAP provider should their participation be helpful. 
Employee is confirmed to have Pandemic Flu 
Employee Action Items 
1. DO NOT COME TO WORK or send family members to collect work for 
you. 
2. Assess risk and determine if further medical care should be sought. 
3. Take AV as prescribed. 
4. Inform local EH or your manager and HR immediately if you are confirmed as 
Pandemic Flu patient. 
5. Follow all guidelines established by the Local Department of Public Health. 
Manager Action Items 
1. Contact employee to gather urgent/ important deliverables to ensure a smooth 
work transition. 
2. If applicable, keep remaining team members informed of the situation. Keep 
employee identity confidential to the extent feasible. 
3. Inform HR. 
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4. Allow other employees within the impacted workgroup to work from home 
for a period of up to 10 days if requested. 
5. Track employee absences related to flu pandemic and add employees name to 
immune status list. 
Employee Health 
I. Clear employee to RTW if they are asymptomatic for >5 days post pandemic 
flu illness. 
2. Think about use of local EAP provider should their participation be helpful. 
Employee and/or Manager needs employee to travel to an infected area. 
Employee Action Items 
I. Confirm that there is a "business essential" reason to travel to infected area. 
2. Check local guidance which may prohibit travel into area where infections are 
occumng. 
3. Check that immunizations and vaccinations are up to date. 
4. Provide updated emergency contact information to manager. 
5. Plan to work from home for a period of7-10 days when returning from 
infected area. 
Manager Action Items 
1. Consider sending an employee who may have immunity due to previous 
pandemic illness. 
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2. Ensure that employee is supportive of traveling to the infected area or 
consider postponing business travel. 
3. Verify that the business trip is essential and critical for business. Consider if 
work can be done by VTC, Live Meeting and/or teleconference. 
4. Request that the employee work from home for 7-10 days when returning 
from infected area. 
Employee Health 
I. Provide travel consultation advise and needed medications and 
immunizations. 
2. Clear employee to RTW if asymptomatic after 7-10 days post travel. 
Employee comes to work ill or becomes ill at work 
Employee Action Items 
I. Notify EH (if on-site), manager or HR by telephone if person feels ill and has 
symptoms of influenza. 
2. Cover mouth and nose with Kleenex (use surgical mask if available). 
3. Leave work immediately. 
4. Avoid use of public transportation. 
5. Assess risk and determine if further medical care should be sought. 
6. Take A V as prescribed. 
7. Inform local EH or your manager and HR immediately if you are confirmed 
as Pandemic Flu patient. 
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8. Follow all guidelines established by the Local Department of Public Health. 
Manager Action Items 
1. Ask the person if they have any of the following symptoms: 
• Sore throat • Fatigue and weakness 
• Cough • Muscle aches and pains 
• Chest discomfort • High fever (or feel feverish and 
hot) 
• Difficulty in breathing • Been overseas recently 
• Headache • Been in contact with someone 
diagnosed with influenza 
If response is "yes" to two or more of the symptoms above, employee should be 
considered as possible case of influenza. 
2. Advise employee to leave work immediately. 
3. Arrange to have work area of ill employee cleaned. 
4. If applicable, keep remaining team members informed of the situation. Keep 
employee identity confidential to the extent feasible. 
5. Advise team members that they have been in contact with suspect case. 
6. Inform HR. 
7. Allow other employees within the impacted workgroup to work from home 
for a period of up to 10 days if they request this. 
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8. Track employee absences related to flu pandemic and add employees name to 
immune status list. 
9. Contact employee to gather urgent/ important deliverables to ensure a smooth 
work transition. 
Employee Health 
I. If contacted by employee, provide telephonic screening for symptoms and 
advise ill employee on appropriate actions to follow based on illness 
symptoms. 
2. If symptoms are consistent with influenza- treat as "suspect case". 
3. Advise employee to cover mouth and nose and leave work immediately. 
4. Clear employee to RTW if they are asymptomatic for >5 days post pandemic 
flu illness. 
5. Think about use of local EAP provider should their participation be helpful. 
Source: GlaxoSmithK!ine Employee Health Management (2006d). 
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APPENDIXF 
ANTIVIRAL HEALTH IDSTORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please return to: 
Purpose Statement Confidential 
The purpose of collecting this personal health information is to assist Employee Health 
or other health professionals in determining which antiviral would be most appropriate for 
you or for your dependents to use as part of the Employee Health Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan. This questionnaire is not intended to be a comprehensive health 
questionnaire, but rather focuses on information which will affect the selection of an anti-
viral for use as directed during an influenza pandemic. This information will remain 
confidential. Providing this information and using anti-viral medication as part of the 
Employee Health Pandemic Preparedness Plan is optional, and is not required. 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Name: Date of birth: Today's 
Date: 
0 Employee 0 Dependent of employee 0 Complementary Worker 
Contact address: 
Contact telephone number: 
PERSONAL MEDICAL HISTORY If YES please give details 
DNo DYes Do you take any medicines? If yes, please list. 
DNo DYes Are you allergic to any medicines or foods? If yes, please list. 
DNo DYes Any tooth, mouth or facial problems which might prevent you from 
using a disc inhaler effectively. (Use of a diskhaler requires 
closing your lips fitmly around a mouthpiece). 
DNo DYes Chronic Lung disease (e.g. asthma, chronic bronchitis or 
emphysema) 
DNo DYes other chronic diseases. If yes, please list 
DNo DYes Currently pregnant or breastfeeding 
OTHER HEALTH CONCERNS 
Do you have any questions regarding a personal medical condition which you feel may 
become an issue while taking anti-viral medication (Relenza or Tamiflu)? 
DNo DYes (If yes, please describe): 
I believe the above mforrnatlon to be true to the best of my knowledge: 
Signature ________________ _ 
Dme ______________________ __ 
Source: GlaxoSmitbKline Employee Health Management (2006e). 
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APPENDIXG 
RELENZA or TAM! FLU DECISION TREE 
Does the person have 
asthma or COPD? 
Consider 
alternative 
protection/ 
treatment 
Yes 
to At least 1 year old? ___ N_o_ 
t Yes 
Consider 
TAMIFLU 
For children up to 13 yrs and 
adults who cannot swallow 
capsules, consider suspension 
No· 
At least 5 yrs old (prophylaxis) 
& 
7 yrs old (treatment)? 
~ Yes 
Consider 
RELENZA 
1 
Use with caution with 
asthma/COPD & ~ 
Renal impairment, 
chronic heart/lung disease 
other uncontrolled chronic illness 
-avoid in severe asthma 
Consult with OHP or medical provider 
or high-risk medical condition? 1 
~Yes l. 
Do not use-consult 
with OHP No Pregnancy & lactation: do not use 
or medical provider unless benefit 
outweighs risk 
Refer to OHP or medical provider 
Source: GlaxoSmithKline Employee Health Management (2006f} 
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